Stuart Reid's All the King's Armies

He relies on contemporary recollections and analyses of the armament campaigns and demonstrates an understanding and knowledge of European forces level in general that guides and retains his version of level(p)ts. For example, he debunks the myth that this civic war was fought by amateurs by referencing the body of knowledge open to English and Scottish soldiers who may have fought in Holland, France and Sweden (Reid 2).

Reid's compendium is exhaustive and he often points out where his conclusions differ from those of preliminary scholars. For example, in Chapter V titled "High Tide: The underlying Front 1643," Reid notes where his interpretation of military commander Richard Atkyns' account differs from that of separate historians. Atkyns commanded a regiment during the war in July of 1643. Reid quotes Atkyns as stating that "we were charging at the utmost man of their right wing [sic]" (Reid 56). In the footnote, however, Reid explains his inclusion of [sic] by noting that Atkyns' reference to the "right wing" has confused different historians into believing that Atkyns was referring to a brigade on the Royalist left. precisely Reid relies on other statements by Atkyns, statements by other military men contemporary to the time, and the general practices of 17th century generals to close down that Atkyns must have been referring to the right flank of the

Parliamentarian left wing (Reid 66 n.5). Thus, Reid's book offers secondary interpretations of the events while pointing out where his interpretations differ. This is important because it allows readers to examine his analysis and coif to their own conclusions about its validity.

On the other hand, Reid's book is even very detailed in areas where he provides no footnotes to support the detail.

There seem to be moments when he looks at the objective accounts of the war and projects onto the participants their motivations given the situation they were facing and Reid's conclusions about their military strategy. For example, in Chapter VI, "Coals from Newcastle," Reid states that " entitle Fairfax began with some reason to suspect the reliableness of the Hothams and, anticipating that Hull might also be delivered into Royalist hands, he decided that his position at Selby was untenable and resolved on a retreat to Leeds" (Reid 72). This statement is not supported by reference to any documentary evidence although it purports to explain Lord Fairfax's motivations for his military maneuvers.

The book, however, does have a particular bias in favor of examining military strategy and practice by proud commanders in the two militaries. Thus, it does not pay very very much attention to the motivations of the "rabble" that made up the armies. It focuses primarily on military strategy at the higher levels and the influence of policy-making events on these strategies, although it demonstrates no particular focus on the semipolitical personalities behind the war, other than to the extent that th
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